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INTRODUCTION 
I\lthou~h iUlernational law tt'xt 
writt'rs, as well as the dt'letratt~ to the 
eonf cn'net'S for the et)(lifi:ation of in-
lcrnationallaw, are in /!eneral agreement 
thal foreign ships lIlay pass freely 
throu~h the It'rrilorial walers of a stale, 
unanimity is lacking as to the spe('ifit~ 
rules which apply. For example, in I\lay 
aud .I une 1967, a major issue in the 
Arah-Israeli war was the maller of iJIIlO-
cent pllssage of Israeli and Israeli-hound 
ships through the Gulf of A(Talla. In 
Aug-lIsl J WI7 the Soviet Union denied 
the righl of innocent passage 'lhrough 
the Vilkitsky Slraits to two U.S. Coast 
Guard iecurellkcrs. 
It is lhc purpO!ie of this paper to 
(~:\ plore the origins, Sllllus, lind recent 
t/(!vdo(lmenls in the internalionallllw of 
innoctmt pllssage of ships lhroul!h the 
lerritorial seas of forcil!n countries. Il is 
a timely suhjeet, as the two incidenls 
ciled lIhove allest. In view of the 
modern trend among mllny eounlries in 
lhe world to claim increasingly wide 
terrilorial seas, innocent passage is tak-
ing on growing imporLanee in the JlllIri-
lime inlereourse of nlltions. With the 
haekground of the current internationlll 
law of innocent passage established, this 
paper will then analyze the conflicting 
nalional claims in the Gulf of Aqaba 
and Vilkitsky Strails incidenls to deler-
mine whelher the current coneepLs re-
main valid or whether ncw usage is 
developing, which usage may in time be 
accepted as customary international 
law. 
I··FREEDOM OF TilE SEAS 
The concepl lhat the seas should be 
open to the free use of all peoples is 
hardly a new one. From ancient Roman 
times on, such an idea has been pro-
claimed. Practice, however, has varied 
considerably from the theory, and for 
the last 400 years mankind has been 
attempting to reconcile the eompeling 
interests of states into a workable set of 
eusloms and rules. 
The Middle Ages saw the develop-
ment of the laws of OIcron and the 
Consolato del Mare. Allhough these 
codes restalcd thc commonality of 
rights under a law of the sea, indi~idual 
states adopted a posilion that continual 
use gave them rights ovcr particular sea 
areas. Thus the Adriatic was claimed by 
Venice, the Ligurian Sea by Genoa, and 
the four surrounding seas by England. 
The prohlem of sovereignty over lhe 
seas, however, did not arise until 1455 
when Pope Nicholas V granted Porlugal 
exclusive rights of navigation, fishing, 
and trading in the African waters be-
yond Capes Boyador and Non. On 
Columbus' return from his first New 
World voyage, the Portuguese king 
maintained that his discovery was in 
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Portuguese waters. Ferdinand and Isa-
bella appealed to Pope Alexander V I, 
who granted to Spain rights in western 
oceans similar to those already held by 
Portugal. While the papal division of the 
world's oceans betwecn Spain and Por-
tugal was disputed, those two nati~ns 
finally agrced that the dividing line 
should be :~40 leagues wcst of thc Cape 
Verde Islands and should circle the 
globe. 
It. appears that this partition wcnt 
unchallengcd by most European coun-
tries, with the noteworthy exception of 
France whose Francis I championed the 
free use of the seas for French mariners. 
Maritime practices during the 16th 
century ranged from exploration and 
trade--with the claims of competing 
countries to exclusive enjoyment of 
portions of thc seas sometimes ob-
servetl--to outright piracy. Elizabeth I of 
England ordained that "Thc usc of the 
sea and air is common to all; ncither can 
any title to the ocean belong to any 
people or private man, forasmuch as 
neither nature nor regard to the public 
use permitteth any possession there-
of. »1 Having the greater maritime 
power to bring to bear, England's use of 
the seas was more readily enforceable 
than France's. Drake's Caribbean vic-
tories in 15B6 effectively terminated 
Spanish hopes for an exclusive use of 
western seas, although Spain did cling to 
her claims to exclusive trade rights with 
her colonies and exclusive navigation of 
colonial waters. Although England and 
France attempted by treaty to acquire 
trade concessions, they never did 
acknowledge that Spain had the power 
to bar ships of other nations from 
American waters.2 
Simultaneous with England's termi-
nation of Spanish exclusivity in western 
oceans, the Netherlands was attempting 
to destroy Portugal's monopoly in the 
cast. In support of Dutch claims to 
trade in the East Indies, Hugo Grotius, 
in 1605, wrote a learned treatise on the 
law of prize. One chapter was puhlished 
separately under tlw title Marl' Ubul/lII 
in l601J. In this brief work Grotim: 
made the first formal statement of 
freedom of the seas as a general prin-
ciple of international law.3 Grotius' 
basic premise was that "every nation is 
free to travel to every other nation, and 
to trade with it," which he amplified 
with the observation, "nature has made 
neither sun nor air nor waves private 
property; they arc puhlie gifts ... the 
sea is common to all, because it is so 
limitless that it cannot become a posses-
sion of anyone, and because it is 
adapted for the use of all .... ,,4 
These views were soon contetllt'(1 hy 
the British who c1ainlC'd mill en('or('('d 
exclusive fishing righttl in "British S('as." 
Supporting such claims were jurists WiI-
limn Welwood and John Seldrn. Wd-
wood saw thc intimae}' of thc land with 
its adjacent sea as requiring national 
retention of the sea and its usc for the 
benefit of the people. Selden amplified 
on Welwood's work and validly notcd 
that nothing in the nature of the seas 
prevented either their appropriation or 
claims to sovereign rights tlterrin.s Thus 
is presented the origin of a conflict in 
the interests of nations which exists to 
this day: the interests in the free use of 
the world's oceans which all nations 
share versus the individual interest of a 
statc in protecting its security as well as 
economic marine resourecs by cxercis-
inl! s()vereip:nty and, thcrehy, cxdusiv(~ 
control over a helt of water adjacent to 
its shore$. 
An aeconlJnodation IJctween such 
competing positions was aLlcl11ptcu in 
l702 by Cornelius van Bynkcrshoek, a 
judge of the SlIl'renll: Court of Appeal 
of Ilolland, who as~('rtcd that "the 
dominion of the land ends where tlw 
power of ,trillS (~nd~," or, "so far a~ 
cannon balls are projecteu. ,,6 The can-
non shot distancc was ~pccifieu at one 
sea leaglw lIy Caliani, an Italian jllriHt, in 
17112. The following y(~ar Scerdary (If 
Stute .I efferson notf~11 in diplolllatie 
corn~spOllllcnce thal thc Iintit which hud 
gailH'd rt'cognitiun alllong nations was 
the lIlaximlllll range of a cannon ball. 
Tlll'rt'a fter t hl' Unilcd States rceo/.,rni1.ed 
the sea league, or "three gco:,rraphical 
miles" as the extent of its territorial sea. 
Sudl limit was also recognized hy Grcat 
Britain, although her early J 9th century 
"hovering acts" (which authorized her 
to urrest ships outside her territoriul 
wuh'rs, on Ihc high seus, on suspicion of 
smuggling) ran countcr 10 such posilion. 
By the lall' 191h eentllry the hovcring 
a~ls had hcen dOIn: away wilh, mill 
Britain unlJuulificdly ace'~pted the 
:l·milc limit of her tcrritorial sovcrcignty 
in the murginal sea.7 
I·'rolll thc time of Grotius into the 
prcscnt century, the free usc of thc scus 
hy ships of all countries has devcloped 
into un internationully acccpted legal 
principle. Coneontitant with thaL prin-
ciple, and developing as u maLII:r of 
custlllllury praeLice, is Lhc righL of ships 
to pass Lhrough thc Lerritorial waters of 
forcign countries wiLhouL interfcrenee 
hy, or suhjecLion to Lhe jurisdiction of, 
Lhe liLtoral stnte. Although Lhc conccpL 
of innoccnL passage is universally uc-
cepLcd as an abstract principle, Lhe 
praeLiee of staLes has not been uniform, 
and disagreements exist today on its 
implementation. 
gfforls Lo codify internaLional law 
began in the 19th century in various 
fields, bUl it was not until the 1920's, 
under lhe direction of the League of 
Nulions, that an effort was made to 
codify the Law of the Sea in tillle of 
Iwaee. The Con ference for the Codifica-
tion of International Law, held aL The 
"ague in 1930, culminated several years 
of scholarly preparution. Although a 
rcasonahle degree of agreenlf:nt was 
reaehcd on oLher matters, induding 
innOl'I'nt passage, adoption of a conven-
Lion failcd because Lhe delegates were 
unuhle to awee on an internationally 
al:I:I:ptuhle widlh of the Jlutiolls' terri-
Loriul seus. K 
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TIll: 19;'1\ (; mu:va Conferelll:e on the 
Luw of the Slm, however, profiling frolll 
the experienel: of Ihe 19:m Clldificulion 
Confcrence, did reudl sufficient uccord 
to udopl four convcntions, including a 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone. It still failed to reach 
abrrcement on a standard width for the 
territorial sea, as did its successor con-
ference in 1960. 
From these intcrnational conferences 
for the codi fication of intcrnationallaw 
one particular trcnd is lIpparenL: 1I hrrow-
iug \Iumhcr o[ nlltio\l!! IIrc cluiming 
territorial waters /,rreatcr in breadth tllUn 
:l miles. A lI.S. proposlll at the 1%0 
llague CO\lferc\lce which would have 
estahlished a 6·milc limit to tcrritorial 
waters with an additional (HniIe con-
tiguous zonc [or enforccment of fishing 
and other laws failcd of adoptio\l Ity 
o\le vote.9 I\)ost of the \lew, so-eallell 
"emerging nations" havc proclaillled 
their territorial waters to he 12 miles 
wiae.1o 
Ilow docs this affcct the maritime 
nations of the world? Cannot thcir ships 
still transit territorial waters of foreign 
nations in innocent passage? As will hc 
demonstrated in later chapters, a nlltion 
may dcny innocent passage to forcign 
ships under certain circumstances. Thc 
maritime nations, and especially thcir 
shipowners lind shippers of cargo, would 
prefer to sail entirely on the high seas 
whcre ships have an ahsolute right of 
passage than to rely on innocent passage 
through territorial walers where the 
littoral stllte may, they fear, act caprici-
ously in denying innocent passagc. With 
many nations now claiming territorial 
waters out to a limit of 12 miles (or 
more), the area of the high seas availahle 
to such unrestricted, unqualified pas-
sage-ncar the shelter and navigationlll 
reference points of land--hus been signi-
ficantly reduced. It is for this reason 
that the attributes of innocent passage 
have become increasingly important to 
the maritime world. 
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ll--NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES 
OF INNOCENT PASSAGE 
The nature of innoeent pas:;ag<' (ah-
solute or qualified right) is dependent 
upon the legal status of the waters 
which border the maritime states. lIis-
torieally, thcre has been disal,rreement 
on such matters. Belying on the Homan 
and Grotian concepts that the seas are 
incapahle of appropriation hy anyone or 
any nation, one school postulated that 
all of the oceans constitute the high St'as 
and that the liLLoral stlltes had only 
limited claims in their marginal waters. 
The opposing school held that thc mar-
ginal waters wcre as much property of 
the littoral states as their land territory, 
fully subject to their sovereignly (i.c., 
exclusive power to eontrol and regu-
latc ).1 International law developments 
of the 20th century, however, have 
re:;olved sud I conflict. The disellssions 
at the 19:W Codification Conference, 
the work of the IntefJIational Law 
Commission preparatory to the I95B 
(;eneva Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, as well as the latter Conference 
itself, procluced a statemcnt eXJlressive 
of customary international law, which 
is embodied in article 1 of the Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone: "Article I. 1. The 
sovereignty of a State extends, beyond 
its land territory and its internal waters, 
to a helt of sea adjacent to its coast, 
described as the territorial sea. 2. This 
sovereignty is exert'ised subject Lo the 
provisions of tlwsc artil'ies and to other 
rules of internationallaw.,,3 
It is thus apparent that the sovereign 
rights of a coastal state in its marginal 
waters are not absolute. Thcy are sub-
ject to limitations irnpolied hy the com-
munity of nations by means of interna-
tional law. One of these is innocent 
passage, which can be characterized as a 
qualification of the coastal state's juris-
diction and sovereignty in its territorial 
waters. Although the draft artidc!s 
("Harvard Ht!seareh") prc:st:nted to the 
19:m Codification Confen:lwll did not 
ehanleLerizc innocent I'ussuge ali a right, 
the at'companying eOlllllll'ntury tlid,4 
unt! the draft artit'll's produt'ed hy tlw 
Conferenec specified innoccnt passuge 
as aright. 5 The 195B Conferenec made 
clear in its discussions and in the Con-
vention on the Terrilorial Sea mill Con-
tiguous Zone that it was indecd a riM"1 
enjoyed by ships. Articles J 4 through 
23 in section III of the J 95B Conven-
tion represented the llgreement of the 
195B Conference as to the criteria of 
innoeenl passage. 
To determine lhe specific Icglll auri-
huleli of innocent passage, the halancll 
of this chllpler will eXliminc tht: provi-
sions of the J 95B Convention and the 
l<,gislative intcnt hchind them. While 
this Convention may be considered as a 
recent authoritative statcment of inter-
national law, SOIllC shortcomings must 
he horne in mind. The provisions of the 
195B Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and Contiguolls Zone do not necessarily 
restate customary international law. 
Neither the International Law Commis-
sion, which drafted a proposed conven-
tion, nor the Conference attempted a 
mere restatement of existing custom, 
but rather undertook to codify a set of 
realistic rules for the regulation of intcr-
national intercourse in the territorial 
seas and the contiguous zone. The Con-
vention does, of course, embody sOllie 
rules of customary international law, 
and to the extent thut it doeli it is 
binding upon all states whcther they bc 
parties to thc Convention or not. Those 
provisions which do not represent prior 
international law arc binding only UJlOIJ 
the parties to the Convention (until 
those provisions receive such general 
aceeptanec alllong the states of the 
world as to achieve the status of cus-
tomary international law). 
Another shortcoming of the Conven-
tion is that it fails to cover sevc:ral 
situations of importance such as the 
width of the territorial sea, whc,thc'r 
warships have an unlimited right of 
illlloC('lIt pa~a/!(!, and a prO\'I:.'1011 ~Pt'­
cifi(~all)' npplyilll! to multillational hays 
such ns the (;ulf of Aqaha. 
Righls of Ships. Basically, ships of all 
:;Iate~ may cxen:ise the right of illnoeent 
I'a:':;agc through the territorial seas of 
fOr\'il!n ~talt'''. SII('h n I'rtlvitlioll watl 
inl'llllll'd in thl' International Law Com-
mission'~ drnft articles which were suh-
miLLed to the Conference for considera-
tioll. The oril!inal proposni wns adopted 
as artier., I '1., para~raph J, with ollly 011(, 
chan/!t,.6 The words "whether t:oaslal or 
nol" were added to dt'scriht, furtlH'r "all 
statetl."7 Thitl uetioll eJlll'hatli7.ed thut 
innocent pa:>sagc was u right accorded to 
ships, ruther than one which depended 
u(>on the reciprocity betwcen coastal 
states. 
In the dehates of the Confercnce, 
concern urose over the transit of fishing 
hoats and warships in innocent passage. 
In question was not whethcr SUeil vcs-
scls had thc right of innocent passage, 
but rather the conditions surrounding 
such passage and the restrictions which 
the coastal state might place on it. 
llaving statcd the gcneral principle of 
the right of innocent passage, the Con-
vention gocs 011 to define "passage" in 
artiele 14, para!,rraph 2, as "navigatioll 
through the territorial sea for the pur-
pose either of traversing that sea with-
out elltering internal wuters, or of pro-
ceeding to internal waters, or of making 
for the high seas from internal waters." 
I Emphasis added.] Such action rcjects 
an earlier view that the aims of a foreign 
vessel transiting the territorial sea for 
the purposc of entering internul waters 
arc inconsistant with the basis of the 
right of innoccnt passage because, it was 
argued, the SUltuS of that vessel was 
deemed assimilated to that of a ship in 
port where the jurisdiction of the coast-
al state is subject to no rcstrietion.s 
The cxtension of innocent passage to 
a ship transiting the tcrritorial sea after 
leaving internal waters is irlllic:ative of 
developmcnt in international law. AI-
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tholl/!h the Harvard Itesl!areh ill Interna-
tional Law, which dmfted artit'it's of tlw 
law of the sea for prescntation to the 
19:10 Hague Couifieation Conference, 
had rejeetcd the concept that vessels 
entering or leaving a port of the coastal 
state eould be in innocl!nt pnssage,9 the 
Codification Conference finully at/opted 
the sUllie provision as the 195B Con-
ference.1 0 
Thus the hasie criterion for innocent 
pa:>sav;e is 1lI0vement, and to this extent 
artide I tI{2) rcfil!ets CIIStOlllury internn-
tionnl law. 1 1 The delegutl!s to tlw Con-
fen'net: were in agreelllent with the 
long-establisheu principles thnt anchor-
ing or "hovering" in the territorial sea 
broke innocent passage and subjected a 
ship to the jurisdiction of the eonstal 
state.12 A specific provision to that 
effeet was introduced in the Conference 
but was rejected as unnecessary. The 
exception to the rule that stopping and 
anchoring, except as incidental to or-
dinary navigation, will hreak innocent 
passage is that of force majeure, as 
embodied in article 14, paragraph 3.1 3 
The humanitarian principle that a ship 
in distress from a force majeure may 
enter foreign territorial waters and 
anchor or may put into port with 
complete immunity from local jurisdic-
tion has been long recognized in intema-
tionallaw.14 
The most extended discussions at the 
Conference related to the problem 
which is basic to all considerations of 
innocent passage in its relationship to 
freedom of the seas: the proper halance 
hetween the security interests of the_ 
coastal state and the overseas 'states' 
need to navigate through territorial seas 
without undue impediment. Such de-
bates centered around the Convention 
provisions which defined "innocent" 
and those which spelled out the rights 
and duties of the coastal states. 
Article 14, paragraph 4, first sen-
tence, provides the hasic definition: 
"Passage is innocent so long as it is not 
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prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal State." The 
article which the International Law 
Commission originally proposed had 
read: "Passage is innocent so long as a 
ship does not use the territorial sea for 
committing any acts prejudicial to the 
security of the coastal State or contrary 
to the present rules or to other rules of 
international law. ,,15 The proposed 
amendments to this original provision as 
well as the ensuing debates are enlight-
ening as to the legislative intent behind 
the adopted provision. 
An amendment proposed by India 
would have added the words "peace, 
good ordcr or" prior to "the security," 
since coastal states had h'l"eater intcrests 
than mcrely security, which thc United 
States characterized as comprehending 
only military sccurity.16 Such addi-
tional interests include control of im-
ports, exports, customs and immigra-
tion, navigation, and crime. 
Ito mania introduced an amcndmcnt 
which, had it heen adopted, would have 
provided that "Passage is inlloccnt as 
long as it is for the normal course of the 
ship .... " [emphasis supplied], ex-
pressing the view that departure from 
such a course was sufficient reason for 
the coastal slate to exercise control. Of 
particular concern to Romania was the 
preservation of economic (fishing) inter-
ests against the "practice of some fish-
ing vessels of putting nets down ilIegaIl~ 
while traversing the territorial sea. ,,1 
Against this proposal the argument was 
raised by several countries that there 
was no such thing as a "normal" course 
for a ship, since its exact course was 
determined by variahle factors, includ-
~ng weather, loading conditions, and 
destination. 
The United Kingdom expressed what 
appeared to he the majority view, that 
the test of innocence of passage was not 
the passage itself, but rather the manner 
in whieh that passage was carried out. 
The dehates centered on whether par-
ticular proposed language adelpmtdy 
conveyed this idea or, instead, l)(~r­
mitted the coastal state to claim arhi-
trarily that the fact of paslmge was 
prejudicial to its interests. The Chilean 
delegate's view was that the language 
finally adopted created a presumption 
of innocence.1S In any event, the deter-
mination of such issue initially rests 
with the coastal state. lL is in thc bcst 
position to judge the question of preju-
dice to its "peace, good order and 
security." Safeguards against a capri-
cious claim include the reciprocal action 
that other coastal states may take as 
well as world public opinion. 
The second sentence of artide I"" 
parngrnph 4, provides that "[ innoel'nt I 
passagc shall take place in conformity 
with these articles and with other rules 
of international law." The reason for 
the split of the International Law Com-
mission's originally proposed single sen-
tence into two separatc sentenccs was to 
deal with two separate issues: the con (Ii-
tions which had to he fulfilled for 
innocent passage; and the extent of 
jurisdiction of the coastal state. A fur-
ther assurance was dcsired that a viola-
tion of a rule of international law (such 
as the requirement for smokeless fuel) 
which did not prejudice the security of 
the coastal state could not be made the 
ground for denial of innocent pas-
sage.19 Therefore, the innocence of 
passage is not determined by the ship's 
compliance with all applicable provi-
sions of international law. 
A further concern of the Conference 
was to insure that fishing boats be 
permitted innocent passage, but that the 
coastal state be empowered to prohibit 
fishing by a ship purporting to pass 
innocently through the territorial sea. 
Proposals for a specific parllgraph cover-
ing fishing vessels were offered. One 
which would have required that fishing 
gear be "stowed away" was critici;r,cd as 
placing a burden on fishing vessels 
which was not rcquired by all ('Ollll-
trics.2o Further, "stowml away" is alll-
biguous in that it dOI:s not spedfy 
wlH're or how gear is to be stowed, 1II111 
a ship lIIay not have time, before enter-
ing territorial waters, to do more than 
brin~ its gear aboard. 
The Unitcd Statcs ami United King-
dom fclt that a spccifie provision on 
fishing vcssels was supcrfluous, since a 
ship illegally fishing in territorial waters 
could not be in innocent passage. The 
provision adoptcd articlc 14, paragraph 
5, conditions the innoccnce of passage 
of fishing vcssels upon their observance 
of "such laws as the coast,ll sLatc may 
make and puhlish in order to prevent 
these Vl'ssds from fishing in the tcrri-
torial sea." 
The fin,ll paragrnph of article L4 was 
an emhodiment oC lhe prevailing vicws 
on submarines, as reflectcd in thc 1930 
Codification Confrrence: in ordcr to bc 
in innoccnt passage, "submarincs arc 
required to navigate on the surface and 
to show thcir flag.,,21 In such manner, 
suhmarines can give cvidence of the 
innoecncc of passage and not constitutc 
a danger to othcr ships in thc territorial 
sea by procccding hcneath thc surface 
whcrc thcy cannot readily bc seen. It is 
significant to note thc position of this 
para{.,rraph among the "Rules Applicable 
'1'0 All Ships," so that all submarines, 
hoth civilian and warships, arc included. 
Duties of Ships. Where rights exist in 
favor of a party, there cxist also com-
mcnsuratc dutics, and innoccnt passagc 
is no cxccption. Article 17 restates 
precxisting international law in requir-
ing ships in innocent passage to comply 
with the laws and f('gulations enal~ted 
by thc coastal statc.2 2 The balancing of 
inten~sts hctwccn ship ami coastal statc 
is found in thc provision that "thc laws 
and r(·gulations enacted hy the coastal 
state l hc I in conformity with thcsl~ 
articlcs and othcr rules of international 
law." Thus this articlc would not rccog· 
nizc a duty on ships in innoccnt passage 
to comply with a law which denicd 
innOI!(mt passa~e in contravl~ntion of 
inte~rnational law. Lest coastal state!! he: 
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tempted to rcquire, by law or regula· 
tion, levies of duties to he paid hy ships 
in innoee~nt passage, articlc I a, para· 
graph I, specifics that "no charge may 
bc levied upon foreign ships hy reason 
only of their passage through the terri-
torial sea." Paragraph 2 rccognizes the 
inherent right of a coastal state to make 
charge, without discrimination, for ser-
vices actually rendered (such as pilotagc, 
towing, et cetera). 
Rights of States. The rights of coastal 
states with rcspeet to ships in innocent 
passa~e arc set forth in article 16 of the 
Convention.23 The first two panlgral'hs, 
whieh reeognize a stale \; power to "lake 
the neeessary steps ill its territorial sea 
to prevent pas(;age which is lIot inno-
cent" and to deal with ships proceeding 
to internal watcrs did not engellder 
controversy at the confercnce. 
Para/.,rraphs 3 and 4, however, re-
vealed differenccs of opinion of what 
the law should he with respect to a 
state's suspension of innocent passage in 
territorial watcrs, generalIy, and in 
straits, in particular. 
The principal intcrnational legal pre-
cedent for discussion of thcse points is 
the decision of thc Intcrnational Court 
of Justice in the Corfu Channcl case.24 
Thc facts of thc controvcrsy were as 
follows: on 22 Octo her 1946, the Brit-
ish destroyers Saumarez and V olnge, in 
company with two cruisers, left the port 
of Corfu and proceeded northward 
through a channel in the North Corfu 
Strait. Saumarez struck a mine, sustain-
ing heavy damage and pcrsonnel casllal-
tics. While assisting Sail mare::, V oln;!e 
likcwise struck a minc. 011 I ~J Novemher 
1946 thc British found a moorcd mine-
field in Albanian tcrritorial waters, 
where its two ships had been damagcd, 
and swept it. Earlicr, in i'vlay 1946, two 
British cruiscrs had traversed the strait, 
and Albanian guns had fired upon thcm. 
Thc legal issues presented were 
whethcr warships could transit till! strait 
lying in Albanian tcrritorial watl:ni in 
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innoc:ent passage without the permission 
of Albania, whether the fact of their 
passage prejudiced Alhania's security, 
what duties were ineumhent upon Al-
bania to give notice of the navigational 
hazard (although Albania disclaimed 
any knowledge of the mining or per-
petrator thereof, the Court found con-
structive knowledge), and whether the 
United Kingdom violated Albania's 
sovereignty by resorting to sclf-help in 
clearing the minefield without Albania's 
permission. 
Albania contended that the North 
Corfu Channel did not belong to the 
class of international maritime channels 
through which a right of passage ex-
isted, since it was a route of secondary 
importance and not even a necessary 
route hetween two portions of the high 
seas. 
The Court held that the determina-
tive factor was the strait's geographical 
situation as connecting two portions of 
the high seas and the fact of its usc for 
intcrnational navigation. It speeifieally 
rejected the contention that the strait 
must he a nceessary route hetween two 
portions of the high seas to estahlish an 
inter~ational right of passagc. After 
noting the considerable use which had 
been made of the channel, the court 
decided that the "North Corfu Channel 
should be considered as falling under 
the catcgory of international maritime 
thoroughfares, through which pagsage 
cannot be prohibited in time of peace 
by a coastal state.,,25 
Alhania contended further that the 
destroyers' passage on 22 October 1946 
was not innocent and therefore violated 
Albanian sovereignty. In support Al-
bania argued, inter alia, that the passage 
took place not for ordinary navigation 
but in a political mission. Evidence from 
the United Kingdom had showed that 
one of the purposes of the passage was 
to test Albania's atlitude (Albania had 
fired on passing British warships on 15 
May 1946); ensuing diplomatic corre-
spondence had revealc:ll Albania's view 
that warships might not transit her 
territorial sea without prior notification. 
The Court therefore analyzed the man-
ner in which the pal'~lIgl' W:I~ perforllll'd. 
The ship~' guns had IH'l'n plael'd in thl'ir 
normal stowage position. Personnl'i, 
however, were at action stations. Find-
ing that the latter prl'caution was rca-
sonahle, till' Court hel,1 that the llnitl'd 
I\.ingdolll ,lid not violate Albania's 
sovereignty by sending her ships 
through Albanian territorial waters on 
22 October 1946.26 
The Court found, however, that thc 
United Kingdolll's "self-help" of sweep-
ing the minefield on l:~ Novemher [94(, 
against the expressed will of the Alhani-
an Government could not be justified. 
This show of force hy a numlwr of 
warships, which remained in A Ihanian 
territorial waters for sOllie time, couJrI 
not constitute innocent passage and 
therefore violated Albanian sovereignty. 
No payment of damages was rC'luired of 
the United Kingdom, however. 
Conversely, the Court found Alhania 
liable. in damages to the Unitcd King-
dom for breach of its coastal state's 
duty to warn of a known navigational 
hazard. 
The Court held that warships might 
enjoy the right of innoccnt passage 
without first obtaining permission from 
the coastal state. Thus the two passages 
of British warships, in May and October 
194(" were innocent inasmuch as the 
ships were navigating through the strait 
without prejudicing Albania's security. 
The British warships' actions of remain-
ing within Albanian waters while swecp-
ing mines in Novembe,r 1946 were preju-
dicial to Albania, hence there was no 
innocent passage. 
A further holding was that Albania 
could not restrict passage through a 
strait connecting two portions of the 
high seas. 
Thus the Conference had before it a 
judicial decision which it might confirm 
by codification or overrule by failing so 
to do. It chORe to codify till: det:ision, ill 
part, ill artiele 16, paragraph 4, which 
prohihits "suspcnsion of the innocent 
passage of foreign ships through straits 
wllieh arc used for intcrnational navip:a-
tion hl'lwe('n one part of the high seas 
a lit I anotllt'r part of the high seas .... " 
The draft proposal of the Interna-
tional Law Commission would have 
limited the prohihition on suspending 
innocent passage to "straits normally 
used for international navigation be-
tw('en two parts of the high scas." The 
Cunllnissioll comm('IIl!'d that inr1usion 
of th(~ wunl "nurlllally" renl~et('d the 
thrust of tlw Iq dl'cision in tll\~ Corfu 
Chllllllt'l casl~. 2 7 The Confcrence, how-
ever, did not so read thc Corfu Channel 
decision and rejected such wording. The 
NI~thcrlands reprt!:-l'ntative explained 
that "normally" had hcen dropped he-
causc it was considered that "paragraph 
.~ should apply to sea-Iancs actually lIscd 
hy intcrnational navigation."28 Thc 
Confercnce's othcr change was to ex-
pallIl on the Corfu Channel case and to 
ext(!lHI tlw prohihition on suslwluling 
innocent passage through straits to 
those connecting the high seas and the 
territorial waters of another state. The 
explanation given was that this "re-
nrcted exh;tinp: usage safeguarding the 
right to usc straits lin~ing the high seas 
with the territorial sea of a State. ,,29 
Saudi Arabia strongly dissented to 
deletion of the word "normally," main-
taining that "innoccnt passage could be 
exerciscd only in recognized interna-
tional seaways; it could not ... be in-
vokcd by ships using the North-West 
Passage, which had ncver been uscd for 
regular international navigation. ,,30 
Saudi Arabia further contested the 
proposition that international law pro-
vided a right of innoccnt passage 
through straits connecting the high seas 
with an internal sea or the territorial sea 
of a particular state, citiny the Corfu 
Channel case for support.3 The weak-
ness of such argument is that the Court 
was only dealing with a strait linking 
two portions of thl! high SI!US, therefOr\! 
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had no need to face the further 1!llCstioli 
of straits connecting high seas with 
territorial seas. The Saudi Arahian dcle-
gate eonehllled: " ... the alllelulcci LexL 
no longer dealt with gl'lll'ral prineipit,g 
of intcrnational law. hUL had hel~n care-
fully tailored to promote the claims of 
one State. ,,32 When article 16 came up 
for discussion later in plenary session, 
the UniLed Arab ItepuLlie delegate at-
tempted unsuccessfully to obtain a vote 
on arLicle 16, paragraph 4, separately, in 
an effort to reinstate the International 
\.lIW COlllllli~~ion's original dnrft word-
ing. Sudl effort WlIS concurred in hy LIlt! 
Saudi Arabian delegate, who reiteraLed 
his charge that "paragraph 4 had been 
drafted with one particular case in 
view. ,,33 lie obviously was referring to 
the Israeli claim of innocent passage 
through the Straits of Tiran and (;ulf of 
Aqaha. 
NotwiLhstanding the Arab challenge, 
paragraph 4 of article I () was adopted in 
Lhe First Committee by a close vote, 31 
to .'lO, with 10 abstentions. Voting 
against were the Arab countries of 
North Africa and the i\liddle East, as 
well as CommunisL bloc countries. In 
plenary session, article 16, as a whole, 
was adopted by a 62 Lo 1 vote, with 9 
abstentions.34 
With regard to paragraph 3 of article 
16 (suspension of innocent passage in 
territorial waters), tht:re was a disagree-
ment over the word "temporarily." 
Romania introduced a proposal to de-
lete it: the effect would Lhus have been 
to give the coastal state latitude in 
denying innocent passage through its 
territorial waters without any time con-
straint. This propo~al was not put to a 
vote; "temporarily" therefore re-
mained.35 
The International Law Commission 
draft of artiele 16, paragraph :3, was 
extensively rewonletl, buL such changes 
merely constituted improvements in the 
wording and did not make any changes 
of substance. As adopted, it provides for 
the temporary sllspen~i(ln of innocent 
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passage by the coastal state in the 
territorial sea if such action is "essential 
for the protection of its security." In 
the First ConlJlliLLee the Unitt'(1 Kinl-(-
dom delegates noted the de~irabiIity of 
wording this provision in such a way as 
to create an "objective" standard for 
the determination of prejudice to the 
security of the coastal state. In reply, 
the Indian delegate noted that security 
questions should be determined by the 
coastal state, since it is in the bcst 
position to have access to and to evalu-
ate the relevant evidence. This view 
prevailed, and although there was sOllie 
further disagreement on the question of 
which wording hest accommodated the 
interests of coastal states and interna-
tional shipping, the prescnt wording of 
article I (l, parahrraph :1, was adopted by 
the First ComllliLLce h~ a vote of :H to 
27, with 5 abstentions. 6 
Thus it can be seen that article 16, 
while stating the rights of coastal states 
to protect their security interests with 
respect to innocent passage, docs limi t 
such rights: innocent passage cannot be 
suspended through straits connecting 
the high seas with either the high seas or 
the territorial waters of a foreign state; 
ill other territorial waters, it lIIay only 
bc temporarily suspended in specified 
areas, and due publication of such fact 
must he made. 
Duties of States. The legislative ef-
fort of the Conference regarding the 
duties of the coastal states served to 
limit their liability. The International 
La w Commission's draft proposal, 
which represented an effort to codify a 
novel area of intermltional law, would 
IUlve ret] uired the coastal states to "en-
sure respect for innocent passage 
through the territorial sea and ... not 
allow the said sea to be used for acts 
contra:;r. to the rights of other 
states." 7 This provision was seen as 
placing the coastal state under a duty to 
police its territorial waters so that one 
foreign state might not illlpinge upon 
the rights of anotlwr, mill to relllove 
ohstacles to innocent passage. The Inter-
national Law Commission believe(1 that 
that provision rel1c(!ted the Interna-
tional Courl of .I IIsli('(' ruling ill Ilw 
Corfu Channt'l ('as,', bul sudl vi,'w W;IS 
contested by the Unill!d Stales as obiter 
dietulII and not intended to state a 
eodifiable rule of law.38 
Fearing an absolute liability which 
could impose an undue economic hur-
den on coastal states, the United States 
proposed deletion of this provision. The 
U.S. proposal was adopted,39 atlll the 
first paral"rraph of article 15, dl~aling 
with duties of coastal states, reUlls 
simply: "The coastal State must not 
hamper innocent passage through the 
territorial sea." 
The second paragraph of article 15, 
as proposed by the International Law 
Commission reads, "The coastal State is 
required to give uue publicity to any 
danger to navigation of which it has 
knowledge." The Conference feared 
that this requirement, as well, was too 
hroad and imposed the duty on coastal 
slates to give notice of dangers no 
matter where they be located, Such a 
burden was deemed inordinate and the 
limitation "within its territorial sea" 
was added.4 0 
The Conference thus incorporated 
the thrust of the Corfu Channel decision 
into the Convention, as the Interna-
tional Court of Justice had in large 
measure predicated the Albanian lia-
hility on the failure to give appropriate 
puhlieity to a known danger to naviga-
tion within its territorial waters. 
Article 18, which prohibits coastal 
states from levying charges on ships in 
innocent passage except for services 
actually rendered, is identical to the 
article drafted hy the Second Commit-
tee at the 1930 Codification Con-
ference.41 It acknowledges the eco-
nomic value of the right of innocent 
passage to the commercial ships of the 
world and emphasizes again the policy 
that coastal states not interfere with 
passing ships. 
Warships. May warships enjoy the 
right of innocent passage in time of 
peace'? Is such right dependent on either 
prior notification to, or the permission 
of, the coastal statc? No othcr aspect of 
innocent passagc is more controversial. 
Onc view is that warships should "not 
enjoy an absolute legal right to pass 
through a state's territorial waters any 
more than an army may cross the land 
territory." The rationale behind this 
view is that foreign warships by their 
very nature pose a threat whereas mer-
chant ships do not, and that the world 
interests which exist in the case of 
freedom of the seas for merchant ships 
are absent in the case of passage of 
warships.42 
The opposing view, espollsed by the 
United States and less than a majority 
of the states represented at the Con-
ference, is that warships do have a right 
of innocent passage, as was held in the 
Corfu Channel case. 
The 1930 Codification Conference 
draft proposals on warships reflected 
the more liberal view;43 the Interna-
tional Law Commission, however, pro-
posed an article which would have made 
the passage of warships "subject to 
previous notification or authorization," 
and the First CommiLtee reported such 
a provision.44 The words "or authoriza-
tion" were dcleted from the article hy 
separate vote, with the U.S.S.R. voting 
to retain them on the basis that every 
state, in the excrcise of its sovereignty, 
should he allle to require prior authori-
zation of foreign warships.4s Saudi 
Arabia voted to retain the requirement 
for prior authorization of warship pass-
age, noting that "a warship could not be 
regarded as a vehicle of peaceful com-
munication, and unauthorized passage 
was tantamount to violation of the 
rights of coastal states and to aggression 
against them." The proposed article 24, 
as amended to require only prior notifi-
cation for the innocent passage of war-
lillips, fniled of adoption (tl.:! for, 24 
against, 12 abstentions) because it did 
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not receive the requisite two-thirds ma-
jority. The "no" votes included the 
Communist hloe and Arah countries, 
which had so vociferously supported the 
rcquirement for prior authorization. 
Thus the Convention contains no provi-
sion according states the right of inno-
cent passage for their warships. 
(Article 23, originally article 25 of 
the International Law Commission's 
draft convention, is the only rule ap-
plicable specifically to warships. It re-
quires warships to comply with the 
regulations of the coastal slate. For 
failure of compliance with such regula-
tions and the coastal state's request for 
compliance, the warships may he 
ordcrcd to leave the territorial sea. This 
provision was adopted by a 7(,-0-1 
vote.) 
1I0wever, the International Court of 
Justice hased its Corfu Channcl case 
holding that warships do enjoy a right 
of innocent passage, without the ncces-
sity for either prior notification to or 
authorization from the coastal sL.'lte, 
upon evidcncc that such was the general 
practice of states.46 Notwithstanding 
the failure of the 1958 Law of the Sea 
Conference to include prior notification 
or permission as a prereq uisite to the 
innocent passage Of warships, a con-
siderable numher of states favor such a 
ruIe. Included in this group are the 
Soviet hloc and Arab states, as demon-
strated by the vote on the International 
Law Commission's proposed arLicle....~4 
and the reservations lodged by several 
states at the time of signing the Con-
vention.47 
Accordingly, it would app,ear that 
the present altitude of a majority of 
states accepts a right of innocent pass-
age for warships-but only if it be 
suliject to a greater measure of regula-
tion than is the case with non warships. 
Coastal State Sovereignty, Flag State 
Jurisdiction. and Ship Immunity. Like 
the 19:W Codification Conferencc, the 
International Law Commission ill its 
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draft articles 20 and 21 (criminal and 
civil jllris(liction) sOll/!:ht not to promul-
gate specific rules resolving the eonllict 
bctwcen the inherent jurisdiction of the 
coastal slatc over its territorial waters 
and thc jurisdiction of the nag state 
over its ships while they transit forcign 
territorial waters. Instead, established 
principles wcre set forth for guidance: 
that the coastal slate would, as a gencral 
rule, refrain from exercising criminal 
juris(iiction ovcr a passing ship unless 
the impact of the erilllc affected the 
eml,;tal state or di,;t urile(1 its PI!:I('(" 
onln, mill tranquility, or unl",;s its 
assistance was requested by the ship 
captain or consul of the flag country. A 
new provision was included for the 
suppression of drug traffic. These rules 
recognized, however, the power of the 
coastal state to cxercise its jurisdiction 
and in no way restricted it. The same 
philosophy applicd to the exercise of 
civil jurisdiction: the eoastal state 
should not (but still may) stop or arrest 
foreign ships exccpt insofar as eivil 
obligations aLLach to the current voyage, 
or in the case of a ship leaving internal 
waters or lying. in the territorial sea 
(article 20). 
Government civilian vcssels in com-
mercial service are assimilated to the 
status of merchant vessels by article 21; 
Government civilian vessels not op: 
crated for commercial purposes are gov-
erned by the provision 0 f artides 14 
through J 9 but arc not subject to thc 
civil jurisdiction of article 20 (articles 
21,22). 
In sum, the 1958 Convention recog-
nizes the jurisdiction of the littoral 
sovereign over vessels in his territorial 
sca and, consistcnt with an accommoda-
tion bctwccn that sovereign's power and 
the free use of thc seas, does not forbid 
the littoral slate to exercise jurisdiction, 
but merely exhorts him not to do so--in 
accordance with the slated guidelines. 
Innocent Passage in Time of War. 
The J9!iB Convention fails to state 
whether it is applicable in hoth war and 
peace. The International Law COlllmis-
:-;ion's cOlllnwntary on its draft Convl~n­
tion on the Law or tlw Sea stated that 
the draft articles it develop('(J WCrt' to 
apply only in time of peace.48 Al-
though there was sOllie (Iiscussion at the 
Conference to the effect that the ar-
ticles considered had only peacetime 
application, the Convcntion on the Ter-
ritorial Sea and Contiguous Zone is 
silent on this poinL. 
It should he noted, howevcr, that 
artil'll\ 10 of Ilaglll' CllnVI,ntion XIII of 
I (J07, concl,rning the rightto and dutil'to 
of neutral powcrs in time of war, 
recognizes that a right of passage of 
belligerent warships throuf'1 a neuLral's 
territorial waters exists. 9 Although 
such passage is noL qualified with the 
adjective "innocent," the eonstrutLion 
placed upon "mere passage" indicates 
that it is intended to apply as "innocent 
passage." 
The Altmark incident in World War 
II illustrates the problems and sonw 
practice with regard to innoccnt pasl:lagc 
in tillle of war.50 
In 1940 the Altmark, a German naval 
auxiliary, was returning to (;crmany 
from the South Atlantic with ahout aon 
British prisoners of war. She took a 
circuitous route which hrought her 
within Norwegian territorial waters for a 
distance of several hundred miles. The 
lilt mark was hailed hy a Norwl'gian 
torpedo boat and in reply to inquiry 
stated that it had no citizens or mem-
bers of armed forces of any belligerent 
aboard. Subsequently, still within Nor-
wegian waters, a British destroyer 
boarded the Itltmark and Ii hera ted the 
prisoners. Norway protcsted the in-
fringement of her sovereignty and viola-
tion of her lieu trality. 
This situation presented the issues of 
whether a helligerent warship enjoys a 
right of innocent passage through neu-
tral waters and, if so, whether sudl 
passage is suhject to any restrictiolls. III 
exchan~es of diplomatic correspon-
d('nce, 1 Britain contell(led that the 
Illtmor" wns mnking helligerent lise of 
Norwny's territorial wnters and there-
fore could not have hcen in "mcre 
passage" and that Norway had a duty to 
ascertain whethcr the A /tillar" 's passage 
constituted helligcrcnt activity in viola-
tion of Norwny's ncutrnlity. Norway 
had n'specl(',1 the imlllunity enjoyell by 
the foreign warship nnd took no adion 
to impcde its passage beyond verifying 
its character as a warship. 
Britnin conceded that "mere pass-
age" in article 10 of lIague Convention 
XIII denoted innocent passage hut con-
strued the distance and duration in-
volved in A lttllorl, 's passagc as defeating 
its innocence, inasllllleh as this Conven-
tion prohibits belligcrents from cngaging 
in military operations in ncutral terri-
torial watcrs. Britain contended that the 
result of Altmar" 's choice of route was 
to obtain a shield against allack by 
virtue of Norway's neutrality. 
Notwithstanding the different in-
ferences drawn by Britain and Norway 
from the fnetnal situation prescnl!'d by 
the !Iltmur" '.~ passagc, hoth agrecd thal 
customary international law permitted a 
helligerent warship to navigate in inno-
cent passage through neutral territorial 
waters.52 Despite the provisions of 
article 12 of Hague Convention XIII,S 3 
neither Britain nor NorwilY regarded the 
fact that Altmar" 's passage through 
It'rritorial waters exceeded 24 hours ns a 
violation of the Convention hut rather 
as evidenee bearing on the innocence of 
the passage. 
Since learned writers on international 
law accord to the coastal neutral state 
the righl to deny innocent passagc in its 
tcrritorial waters to all belligerents with-
out discrimination if it so chooses, and 
Hague Convention XIII is inexplicit, it 
appears that helligcrent warships enjoy 
only a conditional right of innocent 
passage.54 The position of the U.S. 
Navy on this maller appears in article 
,1/1·:1 of the /,aw of NmJaI Warfllre: "a. 
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Passage Through Territorial Sea. A ncu-
tral state may allow the mere pa~sagc of 
warships, or pri"'t~s, of hellifercnts 
through its territorial sea."5 The 
mnplifying footnote to this provision 
reads, in part: 
... Thus, the 'mere passage' that may 
be granted to belligeren t warships 
through ncutral tcrritorial watcrs must 
be of an innoccnt nature, in the sensc 
that it must he incidental to thl.' 
nonnal rcquirements of navigation and 
not intendcd in any way to turn 
ncutral watcrs into a base of opcra-
tions. In particular, the prolongcd usc 
of neutral watcrs by a bclligcrcnt war-
ship cithcr for thc purpose of avoiding 
combat with thc cnemy or for the 
purpose of evading capture, would 
appear to fall within the prohibition 
against using ncutral waters as a basc of 
operations.56 
With respect to the passage rights of 
belligerents inter se, a belligerent is 
entitled, as a matter of customary inter-
national law, to prevent the passage of 
an opposing belligerent's ships or of 
cargo destined for him.5 7 
II1--RECENT INCIDENTS 
INVOLVING INNOCENT PASSAGE 
With the recent legal history of hmo-
cent passage thus set forth, this chapter 
will undertake an analysis of the two 
1967 events of international significance 
in which the issue of the practical 
application of the foregoing rules and 
principles arose: the United Arab Re-
public's denial of innocent passage to 
Israeli shipping through the Straits of 
Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba, which proved 
to be a casus belli for the ensuing war, 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
public's denial of innocent passage 
through the Vilkitsky Straits to two 
U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers. 
Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba. 
On 22 May 1967, President Nasser of 
the United Arab Republic announced 
that his country would prevent Israeli 
ships and othcr ships carrying strategic 
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cargo from transiting the Straits of 
Tiran at the entrance to the Gulf of 
Aqaba.1 This action followed with-
drawal of the United Nations I~xpedi­
tionary Force (UNEF) from the Egypt-
Israel border and from Sharm-EI-Sheikh, 
a fortification overlooking the Straits of 
Tiran from which that waterway can be 
mili tarily controlled.2 (Previously, 
Egypt had blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba 
to Israeli shipping from 1948 to 1957.) 
This action by Egypt, which had 
been coupled with a massing of armed 
forces along her border with Israel, 
evoked consternation and protest from 
the major maritime nations of the 
world, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, and the issues were de-
bated in the Security Council of the 
United Nations in late May 1967.3 The 
basic issue posed by the Egyptian block-
ade was the legality of such action, in 
opposition to the claim of Israel to the 
right of innocent passage through the 
Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba to 
her southern port of EIath. 
The legal arguments of the United 
Arab Republic and Israel were expressed 
in the U.N. debate. As will be seen, they 
arc based upon two different sets of 
operative facts. 
The position of the United Arab 
Republic is twofold. First, the Gulf of 
Aqaba is an Arab "closed sea" and 
therefore constitutes internal waters of 
the littoral states. International law 
recognizes a right of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea, but no such 
right exists as to a state's internal 
waters. Apparently aware of the provi-
sions of article 16, paragraph 4, of the 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone, prohibiting the sus-
pension of innocent passage through 
international straits connecting the high 
seas with the territorial sea of another 
state, the United Arab Republic main-
tains that Israel has no territorial sea in 
the Gulf of Aqaba because her presence 
at Elath was the product of aggression. 
Such aggression, it is argued, occurred 
after the Egypt-Israel Armistice Agree-
ment in 1949, and the applicable inter-
national law doctrine is that helligerent 
occupation cannot he legally converted 
into sovereignty, unle~ the state of war 
was concluded by a peace treaty. 
The second part of the U.A.R. posi-
tion is that the Armistice Agreemcnt of 
1949 served only to end hostilities 
between Egypt and Isracl amI did not 
terminate the state of belligerency be-
tween the disputants. Therefore, Egypt 
was perfectly within her rights as a 
helligcrcnt to blockade Israeli shipping 
and goods from thc Straits of Tiran and 
Gulf of Aqaba, and Israel had no right 
of innocent passage therein.4 This latter 
argument, if the underlying basic as-
~um(lti()n of continued hdligerl'nl:Y 
since 19·W is aCt:('pted, 1101'S not depend 
upon the validity of the "inlt'rnal 
waters" claim. 
In support of its claim that the Gulf 
of Aqaha consists entirely of tlw in-
ternal waters of the three littoral stlltes 
(U.A.R., Jordan, Saudi Arabia) having a 
legitimate sovereign presence on the 
gulf, the United Arab Republic cited the 
example of the Gulf of Fonseca and the 
judicial decision thereon. 
The Gulf of Fonseca case was an 
action brought in the Central ArlH'rican 
Court of .I ustice to set aside a Nicara-
guan grant to the United States of a 
99-year right to operate a naval base on 
Nicaraguan territory bordering the Gulf 
of Fonseca.5 I~l Salvador and Costa 
Rica, both littoral on the gulf, objected 
to the !,rrant. Although there was 110 
dispute hetwcen the parties that the 
waters of the gulf were jointly owned 
and were a "closed bay," Nicaragua 
claimed that they should be divided hy 
extending the land houndaries, whcreas 
Costa Rica claimed that the three states 
had joint, undivided ownership. In sus-
taining the Costa I{ican claim, the Court 
detcrmined that the Gulf of Fonseca 
"hclongs to the special calegory of 
historic bays and is the exclusive prop· 
erty of £<:1 Salvador, lIonduras and Niea· 
ragua." Its rationale was that the Gulf 
of Fonse'ca 
... combines all the characteristics or 
conditions that the text writers on 
intenlational law, the international law 
institutes and the precedents have pre-
scribcd as esscntial to tcrritorial waters, 
to wit, secular or immcmorial POSSl'S-
sion accompanied by allimo domilli 
both peaceful and continuous and by 
acquiescl'nce on t1w part of other 
nations, tI\l' spccial ~co~'I'aphical con-
figuration that safeguards so many 
intcrests of vital importance to tile 
economic, commcrcial, agricultural and 
indlL~trial life of thc riparian Statcs and 
thc absolutc, indispcns.1!J\e nccessity 
that those Statcs should possess Ule 
Gulf as fully as rcquircd by those 
primordial intcrests and the interest of 
national defensc.6 
The Court helll that the ~ulf waters 
w(!re joinLly owned inLernal waters, sub-
jet:L to Lhe terriLorial sea of each coastal 
state.' 
Bdore the SecuriLy Council Lhe 
1I.A..H. related the historical facts Lhat 
the Gulf of Aqaba had been under 
continuous Arab control for over 1,000 
years and constitutcd an inland water-
way subject to absolute Arab sovcr-
ei~nLy, and argued Lhat it Lherefore fell 
within the category of historical gulfs 
which are governed by national internal 
law rather than by internaLional law. 
The Gulf of Fonseca decision was elaim-
cd to be in point, since it concerned a 
multinational bay; furthermore, the 
United StaLes had not disputed the 
position thaL the Gulf of Fonseca is part 
of the intemal waLers of the littoral 
sLates and had accepted the Court's 
decision. 
In support of its argument for a 
continuing status of belligerency, the 
United Arab Republic maintained Lhat 
Israel had constantly violated the armis-
tice ah>TeelllenL and had commiLted acts 
of ag{,>Tession againsL the Arab staLes and 
that Lhe J 956 war had not altered the 
1I.A.lt. rights in its waters; furLhermore, 
Britain recognized the blockade in 
1951, and U.S. ships observed it until 
195(,. 
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On thc otlll:r side of the dispute, 
Israd daimed Lhat Lhe Gulf of Aqaha is 
an international waterway, and, conse-
quently" the Straits of Tiran arc an 
international straiL in which the right of 
innocent passage cannot be suspended. 
In at\llition, Israel saw the 1949 armis-
ticc agreements as tcrminating the belli-
gercncy between herself and Egypt and 
.I onlan; therefore, I';/-''Yptian aeLion Lo 
interfere with shipping in the Straits of 
Tiran violated internaLionallaw.8 
Supporting Lhe Israel position on the 
juridical status of the waterway is an 
aidc-11Ic11Ioire frolll U.S. Secretary of 
State I )ulles to Lhe Israeli Ambassador, 
Ahba Ehan, of 11 February 1957. In 
this document the United States reeog-
niz(:d tlHlt Israel WilS still in occupation 
of areas stipulated by tllP arJllistiee 
agreelllents to he occupied hy E~pt but 
went on to declare that" _ .. the United 
States helieves that the Gulf l.of AlJuha I 
comprehends international waters and 
thaL no IwLion has the right to prevent 
free and innocent passage in the (;ulf 
and through the Straits hrjvin~ access 
thereto.,,9 Isruel also eontcnded that 
the international character of the gnlf 
was attested to by its use by a signifi-
cant amount of shipping under lIIany 
different flags, und that such character 
had been confirmed in the Gencral 
Assembly in March 1957. 
With regard to the belligerency claim 
of the Arah slates, Israel argucd that the 
Security Council resolution of J S(:p-
tember 1951 recognized that the armis-
tice agreements had legally terminated 
the belligerency: " ... since the armis-
tice regime, which has becn in existence 
for nearly two and a lmlf years, is of a 
permanent character, neither party can 
reasonably assert that it is actively a 
belligerent .... ,,10 Thus, disagreement 
centered on two issues that need further 
analysis: the status of the Culf of Aqabu 
and the alleged status of bclligerency_ 
Concerning the first issue, the Arab 
elaims to a closed sea (internal waters) 
in the gulf show several weakncssI!s. 
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Although the Culf of A'laba had hCI~n 
under continuous OUoJllan control for 
ahout 1,200 years, no joint closed-sca 
claim was made by the coastal Arab 
states at the time they gained sover-
eignty in the present century. Such II 
claim was apparently not asserted unlil 
1957, by Saudi Ambia.11 No Arab 
protest was heard against the Ilse of the 
gulf by Ismeli shipping during the 
period from 1957 to 1967. Nor have the 
Arah states agreed to a joint control 
over the gulf, as the coastal states had 
done in the Gulf of Fonseca. In any 
case, unlike the Gulf of Fonseca rq~imr, 
the Arah clo::c<i-sl'a claims have not 
achieved geneml inLernational accep-
tance. l\!orcovcr, Saudt Arabia aIllI 
I':{!;ypt claimed onl) ()-lIIill~ ll~rrilorial 
waters uutil 19!iB, and an ar{!;umcnl 
could have hern made that, since the 
G ul f of Alpha exceeded ] 2 miles in 
width, it contained portions of the high 
scas. In 19!iB hoth countries extcntil:d 
tlu:ir tl~rri lorial sl~a eiaims to 12 milcs, 
thus eliminating, from thcir slllndpoint, 
the possihility of a daim of high sl'as in 
the gulL 12 YeL, throughouL the disputes 
between Israel and Egypt (U.A.lq, the 
latter has pledged to guarantee l to the 
states of the world] "free and innocent 
passage accordin{!; to international law ," 
which does not include such a cOllllnit-
ment to an opposing belligerent.l3 Sucfl 
a position is, of course, inconsistent 
with II closed-sea claim. 
Israel's legal position on thc (;ulf of 
Aqaba likewise contains some weakness-
es. The Dulles aide-memo ire cited above 
appeared to condition the reeognition 
of the international character of the gulf 
upon Israel's withdrawal of troops from 
El,'yptian territory. The 1 Septembcr 
1951 Security Council resolution dealt 
with the Suez Canal only and could be 
eharacterized as political in nature and 
not intended to make a legal determina-
tion of the status of nonbclligerency. 
Finally, the Arab claim that Isracl's 
presence at Elath on the Gulf of Aqaba 
lacks legitimacy fails to lake into ae-
count th.c fact that such occupancy was 
clearly sct forth in the Israel-.J ordan 
Armistice Agreement, which followed 
the occupation in questio n.14 
Thc U.S. position on thc 1I.A.B.'s 
denial of passagc lhrough lhc Stmils of 
Tiran was exprcsscd hoth by I'rc8idcnt 
.I ohnson in a statement released 2:3 1\1ay 
L 967 anti by Ambassador Goldberg in 
the Security Council debates. The Presi-
dent stated that: 
•.• The Uniled States considers the 
gulf [of Aqaba] to be an intcrnational 
watenvay and feels the blockade of 
Israrli shippin/! is iIIt'/!al .•• Thl' Hillht 
of frec, innocent pa&.<age of the inler-
national watenvay is a vital interest of 
the entire international eommunity.IS 
Amba:;sador Goldberg echoed thrsl' 
views, noting that the "rights of all 
trading nations undcr international law" 
were at stake and ciled articlc 16, 
paragraph 4, of the 1958 (onvention on 
the Tcrritorial Sea and Conligllous Zone 
as expressive of thaL law. l Alth()u~h 
the 1I.A.lt representative might have 
argued, in rebuttal to the U.S. pm;ition, 
that article 16, paragraph 4, had no 
applicability to the Arab stales since 
they had not ratified the Convention, he 
instead argued that it was inapplicable 
to situations involving armed connicL. 1 7 
'['hilS thl' U.A.lt appears to havc con-
ceded that article 1 (), paragraph 4, is 
expressive of customary international 
law in time of peace. 
What then is the stalm; of the (; ulf of 
Aqaba? As noted in chapter II, the 195B 
Conference on the Law of the Sea did 
not attempt to codify the law with 
respect to multinational bays. After 
exten<lell debate on lhc wording of 
article 16-4, it set forth a general prin-
ciple of freedom of international sea 
transit which guarantees innocent pass-
age through straits connecting the high 
seas with a state's intcmal waters. 
As to gulfs and bays bordered hy 
more than one state, a rule of general 
acceptance has been that: 
... all !lulfs and bays cncl()~t'd by lhl' 
land of more than onr littoral Stale, 
however narrow their entrance may be, 
arc non-territorial_ They arc parls of 
the open sea, the mafl:,<inal belt in~ide 
the b'lllfs and bays exeepted_ They can 
n('vcr be appropriated; Lhey arc ill lime 
of Jleaee and war oJlen to vessels of all 
nations, including men-of-war, _ •• 18 
In light of this criterion. thc recency of 
the Arab claim to a closed sea, amI the 
lack of international recof.,rnition of such 
claim, it is submiLLed Lhat Lhe facts 
underlyinp; the Gulf of Fonscca decision 
arc disLinguishable from the facts of Lhe 
instant ('usc. The waters of the {;nlf of 
Aqaba do noL constituLe inLcrnal waLers 
of the litLoral Arab sl<ltes, and the 
SLraits of Tiran arc not snbjccL to 
8m,pension of the right of innocent 
passage. 
The final portion of the U.A.It. legal 
jnsLifieation for blockading the Straits 
of Tiran to Israeli shipping was that a 
staLe of belligerency exisLed between 
that state and Israel, since the armistice 
agreements then effective merely ter-
minated hostilities. This position does 
noL depend upon the juridical nature of 
the waters of the gulf, since a belligerent 
is entitled to prevent the passage of the 
vessels of an opposing belligerent, or 
cargo honnd for him. The opposing 
Israeli position-supported by the 
United States--hold that the armistice 
af.,l'feements of 1949 with Egypt and 
.I ordan terminated belligerency as wcll 
as hostilities and that the U.N. Security 
Council had so recognized in its resolu-
tion of I Septemher 1951 and discus-
sions in 1957. In any event, it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to explore the 
merits of the conflicting views as to the 
legal effcct of an armistice. That portion 
of the U.A.It. claim will be determined 
with reference to rules other than the 
Law of the Sea. 
Vilkilsky Straits Incident. In August 
19()7 the United States announced a 
planned scientific expedition by two 
Coast Cuard icebreakers, Rdisto and 
Norl/twituL, to dr<:l1l11l1avigaLc: the Arc:-
tic ()cean. The original itinerary would 
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have taken Lhe ships north of several 
Soviet islands, including Severnaya 
Zemlya, and they would thereby have 
traveled entircly on the high seas. 
Icc eOJl(litions, however, prevenLed 
the icebreakers from going to the north 
?f Severnaya Zemlya; the U.S. Emhassy 
m Moscow so notified the Soviet Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs on 24 August, 
staLing that it would be necessary for 
t!lC _two ships to transit the Vilkitsky 
Stratts between Severnaya Zemlya and 
the mainland. The Soviet 1\ linistry of 
Foreign Affairs replied to the U.S. 
I~mhassy that the straits were Soviet 
territorial waters. 
On 2B August the Soviet I\linistry, 
responcling to a message from the U.S. 
ships to the Sovicl Ministry of the 
Maritime Fleet, reaffirmed iLs earlier 
declaration and sl<1ted further that the 
U.S.S.lL would claim that transit of the 
ships through the Vilkitsky Straits 
would violate Soviet frontiers. The 
United States then determincd not to 
send the icebreakers through the ViI-
kitsky Straits and changed their assign-
mcnts. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow 
sent a notc of protesL on :30 August 
which stated, "that thc Soviet law can-
not have the effect of changing thc 
status of international watcrs and the 
rights of foreign ships with respect to 
them. These rights arc set forth clearly 
in the Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and Contiguous Zonc ... to which thc 
Soviet Union is a party." The note 
apparently went on to point out that 
the right of innocent passage existed 
through straits used for international 
navigaLion bctween two parts of the 
high seas whethcr or not they he charac-
terized as having overlapping territorial 
waters and that an unlimited right of 
passagc exists in straits comprisin~ both 
high seas and territorial waters.} (The 
Vilkitsky Straits are about 20 miles 
wide at Lhe narrowest point; the 
U .S.S. It. claims a 12-milc Lerri torial 
sea.) 
From the ,cited State Departmcnt 
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account, the Soviet legal position is not 
clear. It could have been based on any 
of the following three theories: the 
passage of the U.S. ships was prejudicial 
to Soviet peace, good order, or security; 
the ships in question being warsliips 
(within the definition of article 8 of the 
1958 Geneva Convention on the Iligh 
Seas), their passage would not he in 
conformity with the requirements of 
Soviet domestic legislation; finally, it 
might have been claimed that Vilkitsky 
Straits are not an inli'rnational water-
way, through which a right of innocent 
passage exists for foreign ships. 
With regard to the possible prejudice 
to Soviet security, it is difficult to 
envision how a scientific expedition 
would be thusly prejudicial ahsent sOllie 
hostile action hy the ships themsclves. 
The fact of passage itself must not be 
sufficient /,rround for the coastal state to 
deny innocent passage. 
At the time of signing the Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea und Con-
tiguous Zone, the Sovict Union cntered 
two reservations, one of which con-
cerned article 23: "The Government of 
the Union of Soviet Soeiulist Republics 
considers that u coaslal slate hus thc 
right to establish procedures for the 
authorization of the passage of foreign 
warships through its territorial 
wuters. ,,20 In pUrSIllUII!e of such posi-
tion, the U.S.S.R. has enuetcd laws 
which require prior consent for the 
innocent passage of warships. Such con-
sent must be requested through diplo-
matic channels 30 days in advance.21 
Article 23 of the Convention provides 
that, "if any warship does not comply 
with the regulations of the coastal state 
concerning passage ..• the coastal state 
may require the warships to leave the 
territorial sea." The "regula-
tions ... concerning passage" arc deem-
ed to he rules of navigation? 2 Further, 
the Soviet regulations cannot be such as 
to deny innoccnt pm;sagc!, in view of the 
provision of article 17 and discussions 
held thereon at the 1958 Law of the Sea 
Conference. In the present ease, the 
United States did not and could not 
foresee, at least :lO days in advance, that 
its ships would be forced by icc to 
transit Soviet territorial waters. lienee, 
if noncompliance with the authorization 
provisions was part (or all) of the basis 
for denying passage, that denial was 
improper. 
Whether the Vilkitsky Straits are an 
international strait, through which itlllO-
cent passagc cannot be suspendl'd, is not 
frec from douhl. Tlw te:\t writcrs gen-
erally agree that a strait in the geo-
graphical sense is not necessarily one in 
the legal sense? 3 The International 
Court of .J ustic/: found the Corfu Chan-
nel to be legally an international strait 
on the bases that it cOlllwctcd two 
portions of the high scas and was used 
for international navigation. Thc Court 
rejected the idea that the strait be a 
necessary one for shipping. Though the 
Corfu Channal ease decision is cited as 
the leading authority on the point, 
differing conclusions are drawn from it 
as to the legal test for an internatiorml 
strait. Oppenheim :,tates that "It is 
sufficient that [thc strait! has been a 
useful route for intcrnational maritime 
traffic. ,,24 Professor Baxter, eoncurring 
generally in the foregoing view, warns 
that "It is impossible to answer in the 
abstract how many straits meet the 
requirement of being 'useful' for inter-
national navigation, for the test" applied 
by the Court lays more emphasis on the 
practices of shipping than 011 geo/,rraphic 
necessities. ,,2 S 
A third view is that expressed by 
.I udge Azevedo in his dissenting opinion 
in the Corfu Channcl case: " ... the 
notion of an international strait is al-
ways connected with a minimulll of 
special utility, sufficient to justify the 
restriction of the rights of the coastal 
State--which rights must be assumed to 
be complde anti ('I]ual to those of otlll'r 
States."26 I,'wm thi:-: O'Con11l'1I clecllll·("~ 
that the "correct approach is to balance 
the intcrest which the coastal state has 
in its own territorial sca against that 
which the international maritime COIII-
munit), has in travcrsing that pass-
age.,,27 
In view of tlw location of the Vil-
kitsky Straits, north of Siberia, where 
they arc closcd hy iee for most of the 
year, it is douhted whether the intcrna-
tional maritime conununity has, in thc 
past, madc usc of thcm. On the othcr 
hand, if thc tcst be one of present 
usefulness, in times of icing to thc north 
of Severnaya Zcmlya the Vilkitsky 
Straits are indccd the only means of 
transiting thc Arctic Oce"an at that 
point. Applying the "halaneing of inter-
rsts" test, it is suhmitted that the 
intcrrsts of thc maritimc nations in 
navigating the An:tic regions, though 
possihly slight today, certainly outweigh 
the even slighter security interests of the 
U.S.S.R. in denying passage to ships 
which dcsire to pass peaecfully. 
When considcring the foregoing, to-
gcther with the aelion of the 195B Law 
of the Sea Confercnce in expanding the 
rights of nations for their ships to pass 
innocently through straits in article 16, 
paragraph 4, of the Convention on the 
'l'erriturial Sca and Contiguous Zone, it 
is conclucled that the Vilkitsky Straits 
arc international ancl that the U.S.S.R. 
should not have denicd innocent passage 
through them on that account. 
Whatever the Soviet legal theory may 
have been in its clenial of usage, it 
should be noted that the United States 
preserved its legal position by its note of 
protest which asserted the international 
nature of the Vilkitsky Straits. 
IV--CONCLUSIONS 
Thc action of thc Unitcd Arah Bc-
public in denying Israeli shipping hmo-
cent passage throngh the Straits of Tiran 
- and (; IIlf of Aqaha in no way dl:tr:u:ts 
fWIII tIle illll'matiollally f('CI1"11 i1.l:d 
. If' to> rig It 0 mnoccnt passage. Arab declara-
tions expressly recognized the existence 
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of sueh right. Innoecnt passage was only 
denied hy the 1I.A.lt insofar as iL 
Ill'lIdilell a claimed opposing heIliger-
l'nl. \\'hether stH:h dcniul comported 
with international luw will depend sole-
lyon the legal effect one may attribute 
to the armistice al,rreements hetween 
Isracl and Egypt U1HI Jordan. ]f thcy 
terminated belligerency, as Israel and 
the Unitcd States claim, then Egypt was 
not legally justified in denying Israel the 
righ L 0 f innocent passagc. But at all 
limcs Egypt did recogni1.c that a right of 
innoccnt passage through the Straits of 
Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba existed as to 
nonbelligcrent nations. 
The U.S.S.R. denial of innocent pass-
age through the Vilkitsky Straits is 
consistent with the Soviet position re-
garding the innoeen~ passage of war-
ships. She has continuously maintained 
that such passage is suhject to the prior 
approval of the littoral state, and her 
internal laws require hcr approval of 30 
days in advance. 
It is concluded that no new interna-
tional legal usages huve hcen iniLiated as 
a result of the denial (If innocenL pass-
age to Israel in the Gulf of Aqaba and 
Straits of Tiran: the legal positions of 
Israel and the Arab states have remained 
materially unaltered for the last decade. 
With regard to the Vilkitsky Straits 
incident, it appears that the traditional 
Sovict position with regard to innocenL 
passage of warships was maint'-lined. 
There was one possibly novel aspect to 
that case, however. In attempting the 
passage of its ships through Vilkitsky 
Straits, the United States was asserting 
the international legal character of those 
waters, a position which the U.S.S.lL 
apparently contested. Although the au-
thor favors characterizing the Vilkitsky 
Straits as international straits in which 
the right of innocenL passage exists, the 
issue is by no means free of doubt. If 
the Vilkitsky Straits are not deemed 
intcrnatiollal straits, then the UniLed 
States has taken the first step toward 
changing that regime. 
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The factor common to thcse two 
cases and rcflected in the discllssions at 
the I ()5B Law of the Sea Conference is 
that the determination of the innocence 
of passage initially rests with the coastal 
state. 
The discussions on the Convention 
on the Territorial Sea and Conti/-!:uous 
Zone demonstrated that each state ap-
proaches the codification and develop-
ment of international law from the 
standpoint of prornotin/-!: such legal rules 
or principles as will serve its own per-
ceived best intrrests. Any specific na-
tional goal may not, however, be in 
accord with what the community of 
natiom; eonl:eives to he in the hest 
interest of all states. One may expect 
that a state's natural, initial inclination, 
when judging possihle prejudice to its 
peace, good order, or security, will be to 
apply a purely subjective standard. The 
discussions on the Convention recog-
nized this situation and made it clear 
that the coastal state's determination of 
prejudice to its security will be suhjed 
to revi(!w lIy the na/-!: state of a ship 
which suffers a denial of inno(:ent pass-
age and by world opinion. Diplomatic 
protest and the seeking of reparations 
(apology and/or .compensation) arc 
avenues by which a state may seck 
redress for a denial of innocent passage 
to a ship of its flag when it deems the 
denial to have been improper. Just such 
measures were taken by the United 
Kingdom in the Corfu Channel incident. 
The additional step of seeking redress 
before the Intcrnational Court of J us-
tice was undertaken in that case, and 
the Court thcn had occasion to hear 
cvidence and rendcr an objective judg-
ment on the merits of the competing 
claims. 
Thus the coastal state's determina-
tion of whether a particular passage is 
prejudicial to its sccurity nllll-t he made 
objectively: if it is ehallengc(1 it will he 
suhject to review in a manner similar to 
that in the Corfu Channel incident. A 
concern that the coastal state's basis for 
judgment he as objective as possible was 
amply demonstrated in the discussions 
of the Territorial Sea Convention. Even 
though each state's evaluation of its 
security will he a reflection of its 
individual personality, which in turn is 
the product of its historical heritage as 
well as present world conditions, the 
only workable standard for thc deter-
mination of a stall: 's denial or suspen-
sion of innocent passage in its territorial 
sea is one of objectivity: is such a denial 
really necessary, and are the circum-
stances such that the community of 
nations, in retrospect, would approve? 
I f there is not such an objective test 
to be applied to sllspensions or denials 
of innocent passage in practice, the 
conllllullity of natiolls will be subject to 
the arbitrary denial of passage by states 
which consider, subjectively, only their 
own parochial interests. 
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